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We develop a model of the location of global R&D investments by multinational firms, where 
research investments increase the number of varieties of goods sold globally by the firm, and 
development activities reduce the cost of producing existing varieties in specific countries. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection in a country enhances the efficiency of the firms’ 
local research as well as the profitability local development efforts. We test predictions of the 
model on survey data on foreign and domestic R&D for 605 Japanese multinational firms 
with manufacturing activities in 42 foreign countries in 1996. We find the strength of IPR 
protection  to  have  a  positive  impact  both  on  development  expenditures  and  research 
expenditures  in  a  country,  while  both  research  and  development  expenditures  are  also 
sensitive  to  local  wage  costs.  Research  expenditures  depend  positively  on  technological 
opportunities  in  the  industry  and  country,  while  development  expenditures  are  positively 
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An expanding literature has developed focusing on the determinants and role 
of R&D conducted in foreign affiliates (e.g. Kuemmerle 1997, Frost 2001, Florida 
1997, Belderbos, 2001; 2003; Kuemmerle, 1999; von Zedtwitz and Gassman, 2002; 
Odagiri and Yasuda, 1999; Zejan, 1990; Kumar 1996) and the possible impact of such 
R&D and overseas knowledge sourcing on productivity of parent operations (Iwasa 
and  Odagiri,  2003;  Griffith,  Harrison,  and  van  Reenen,  2003,  Fors,  1996).  This 
literature suggests that whereas traditionally overseas R&D was conducted to adapt 
home-developed  technologies  to  foreign  markets  (‘home  base  exploiting’  R&D), 
foreign R&D activities are now becoming more important vehicles to access local 
technological  expertise  abroad  and  to  create  new  technologies  (‘home  base 
augmenting’  R&D).  Although  Japanese  firms  have  been  relatively  slow  to 
internationalize R&D activities, recent evidence has suggested that a growing share of 
R&D activities is now performed abroad (e.g. Belderbos 2001; Odagiri and Iwasa 
2004;  von  Zedtwitz  and  Gassmann)  and  that  the  role  of  home  base  augmenting 
research  is  likewise  increasing.  Such  overseas  R&D  may  serve  as  a  source  of 
complementary knowledge flowing back to the firms’ R&D activities in Japan and 
increasing R&D productivity (Odagiri and Iwasa 2003, Branstetter 2000). 
The environment for overseas R&D has much improved due the changes in 
institutions  related  to  patent  and  other  intellectual  property  rights  systems  as  a 
consequence of the agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(IPR). The advantages and disadvantages to developing countries of adopting stronger 
protection measures for IPR continue to be subject of a debate among policy makers 
and academics. There have been a number of theoretical contributions (e.g. Helpman, 
1993; Lai, 1988; Glass and Saggi, 2002) suggesting that the welfare implications to 
developing  countries  could  either  be  negative  or  positive.  Empirical  work  on  the 
impact of IPR has concentrated on the effect on the value of US firms’ licensing   3 
(Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2000), the value and composition of foreign firms’ 
FDI  (Lee  and  Mansfield,  1996;  Smarzynska,  2004;  Maskus,  1998)  and  imports 
(Smith,  1999).  Overall  these  studies  have  suggested  a  positive  impact  of  IPR 
protection  on  imports,  FDI,  and  incoming  technology  transfer  through  licensing, 
although some studies suggest that no impact of IPR protection can be found in the 
absence of a degree of economic development.  
A  further  possible  positive  consequence  of  IPR  protection  is  obviously 
increased R&D investments by multinational firms. However, empirical research in 
this area appears to be very scarce. Kumar (1996) presents an analysis of aggregate 
data in a cross country study of Japanese and US R&D and finds a positive impact on 
R&D decisions but not on the level of R&D, but his analysis of 1989 data predates the 
TRIPS agreement.  A recent study by Branstetter et al (2003) examines the impact of 
reforms in intellectual property rights protection regimes in 12 countries on R&D and 
intra-firm licensing arrangements by US multinationals firms to their local affiliates at 
the firm level. Using a fixed effects model estimated on panel data over a 1982-1999, 
they find a robust positive impact of IPR reform on both licensing and R&D activities 
by US affiliates, but only for multinational firms that possess an above median patent 
portfolio. The intuition is that firms that do not actively use patents to protect their 
inventions benefit less from changes in the patent regime abroad. 
  In this study we contribute to the literature by examining the impact of IPR 
protection  on  Japanese  multinational  firms  R&D  investments  domestically  and 
abroad. We use data at the firm level from the survey on Trends in Business Activities 
of Foreign Affiliates conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 
fiscal year 1996 (year ending April 1, 1997). We extend the analysis in Branstetter et 
al. (2003) by including more than 40 countries and by examining the R&D response 
of Japanese firms. We measure the strength of patent protection regimes in different 
countries by adopting the patent system score method developed by Ginarte and Park 
(1997), for which data are available in 1995. We further explore the R&D responses 
of Japanese firms by making an explicit distinction between research activities on the 
one hand and development activities on the other hand. Development activities form 
the core of R&D activities in developing countries but may be determined differently 
from  research  activities  such  that  estimation  of  one  model  for  both  research  and 
development may obscure the real impact of IPR regimes. We formalize this intuition   4 
by  developing  a  model  in  which  firms  determine  the  allocation  of  research  and 
development expenditures over home and host countries. 
 
 
2. A Model of the Location of Research and Development Activities 
 
We  develop  a  simple  model  of  the  location  of  research  and  development 
activities by firm j in industry i., where research activities increase the variety in 
commodities  produced,  and  development  activities  in  each  country  reduce  local 
production costs. Let C denote the set of all the countries in the world. We consider a 
two period model. In period 0 a multinational firm j produces a set of commodities 
and also conducts research and development activities in one or more countries. Rc,j 
and Dc,j denote the firm’s research and development activities in country c. In period 
1, firm j produces an expanded set of commodities, with Zj,t denoting the index of the 
variety of commodities that the firm can produce in period t. We assume that research 
expenditures augment the variety of products the firm can produce, and that research 
in all locations contributes to the variety expansion. Hence, Zj,1 is a function of the 
existing variety of commodities in period 0 (Zj,0) and research expenditure in all the 
countries in which the firm performs research activities Rc,j (cÎC). We assume the 
following relationship between that the variety index in period 1 and the variety index 
in period 0:  
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where  ￿c,i  >  0  is  the effectiveness  of  research  in  a  country.  This  depends  on  the 
country’s technological opportunities in the industry (Oc,i), the quality and availability 
of scientists and engineers in the country (Nc), the cost of R&D (Uc), and the degree 
of IPR protection (Pc). If intellectual property rights (IPRs) in country c are not well 
protected or enforced, local firms in country c will be able to learn from the research 
efforts of the firm and mimic some of the firm’s new products, which will reduce the 
effectiveness of product innovation:  
   5 
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Equation (1) implies that if the firm does not conduct research, it can not expand the 
variety  of  its  products.  1/(1-￿)  denotes  the  elasticity  of  substitution  of  research 
between countries, with 0 < ￿ < 1. The scale parameter ￿ is assumed to be smaller 
than 1, implying decreasing return to the scale in research.  
We  assume  that  in  each  commodity  market  the  firm  is  in  monopolistic 
competition and faces a demand curve with a price elasticity of 1/(1-￿), with 0 < ￿ < 1. 
We also assume constant returns to scale in the production of each commodity. Let 
mc,j,z,t denote firm  j’s marginal production cost of a  commodity  z  in country c in 
period t. Then, firm j’s profit from the production of the commodity in country c in 
period 0 is given by: 
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where Ec i,0 is the index of market demand in the commodity’s industry i in country c 
in period 0. mc,z,0* is the index of other firms’ production costs for commodity z in 
country c in period 0, and Sc,j,z,0 denotes sales of the commodity in country c in period 
0.
1  Firm  j  can  reduce  the  marginal  cost  in  period  1  (mc,j,z,1)  by  investing  in 
development  efforts  in  country  c:  Dc,j.
2  Development  activities  in  country  c  are 
conducted in order to adapt firm j's products or production processes to local market 
conditions. We express this firm’s relative cost competitiveness for commodities in 
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where  ￿c  (￿c>1)  is  the  effectiveness  of  development  expenditures  in  country  c.  ￿ 
denotes  the  degree  to  which  there  are  declining  returns  to  scale  in  development 
                                                
1 To simplify our analysis, we assume the firm’s products are not internationally traded (e.g. because of 
large trade costs or the need to adapt products to local market conditions).  
2 We assume that developments efforts are geared toward cost reduction. An alternative specification 
would be to let developments effort expand relative demand in the country. This would lead to similar 
results.    6 
efforts, with 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < 1 – ￿ – ￿￿. The effectiveness of development efforts 
depends on the quality and availability of scientists and engineers in the country (Sc), 
the cost of R&D (Uc) in the country, and the degree of IPR protection (Pc). If IPRs are 
not  well  protected,  other  firms  will  mimic  this  firm’s  new  technology  for  cost 
reduction and reduce the effectiveness of the firm’s development efforts: 
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Firm j’s profit from the production of a commodity z in country c in period 1 is given 
by: 
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where Gc,i denotes one plus the growth rate of the market demand in the commodity’s 
industry i in country c. 
The firm chooses R and D in each country to maximize the following profit 
function:  
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where r denotes a discount factor. Since commodity profit functions are independent 
of z we can write: 
 








j z c j
C c
j z c j Z z
C c
j z c Z z
C c
j z c Z rZ dz dz r
j j
0 , , , 0 , 1 , , , 1 , 0 , , , 1 , , ,
0 , 1 ,
p p p p     (8) 
 
Differentiating (7) with respect to R and D, using (1) – (6) and (8), we obtain the 
following first order conditions: 
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where  j c i c j i c R , , , , 1 j + = G ,  j c c j c D , , 1 q + = D . Sc,j,0 is equal to Z  j,0*Sc,j,z,0 and denotes 
firm j’s total output in country c at time 0.  
In  equation  (9),  the  left-hand  side  represents  the  marginal  gain  due  to  an 
increase in research expenditures R measured on an efficiency basis (￿c,i,j), while the 
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The ratio of research expenditures in any two countries measured on an efficiency 
basis  only  depends  on  the  relative  efficiency  of  research  activities  in  the  two 
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The ratio of the optimal development expenditures D in any two countries measured 
on an efficiency basis depends on the relative efficiency of development activities in 
the two countries, relative output in the two countries, and the relative future market 
potential in the two countries. 
Next, we explicitly solve for optimal expenditures on R and D. From equation 
(10), we have: 
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Using (13) and (9), we get: 
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From this equation and equation (11) we can solve for R: 
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If there are diseconomies of scale in research (￿ is small) and research activities in 
different countries can be substituted relatively easily (the elasticity of substitution ￿ 









1 >0.  This  implies  that  research 
expenditures in country c increase in the efficiency of basic research in that country 
(￿c,i j), decrease in the efficiency of basic research in all the other countries (￿c’,i,j if 
c’¹c),  and  increase  with  the  global  market  potential  for  the  firm  (￿
ÎC c
j c i c S G 0 , , , ) 
augmented with the global efficiency of its development activities (￿
ÎC c
j c, q ). 
Lastly, we solve for the optimal value of D. From equation (13) we can also 
derive: 
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Under the conditions of decreasing returns to research and an elasticity of substitution 







































Under this condition, development expenditures in country c (Dc,j) is an increasing 
function of the efficiency of development efforts in country c (￿c,,j), an increasing 
function  of  local  output  and  the  expected  growth  rate  of  local  demand,  and  an 
increasing function of the global efficiency of the firm’s research activities and the 
global market potential for the firm. In contrast with research expenditures, there is no 
competition  for  development  expenditures  among  countries  and  the  efficiency  of 
development  activities  in  all  countries  (￿c,j)  has  an  additional  positive  impact  on 
development expenditures in country c. The reason is that efficiency of development 
activities stimulates global market shares and hence research activities and the firm’s 
variety in commodities, which in turn make development activities more effective in 
local markets. 
 
   10 




Equation  (15)  suggests  an  empirical  specification  for  research  expenditures  in  a 
country,  in  which  Rc,j  depends  positively  on  ￿c,i  j.  and  on  a  number  of  variables 
describing the firm’s global research efficiency, development efficiency, and market 
potential. It is then convenient to express R and D in each country relative to R and D 
in a base country, for which we take the home country h. If we hence take as the 
dependent variable the ratio of research expenditures in each foreign country relative 
to research expenditures in the home country, the variables related to the firm’s global 
R&D efficiency and global market potential no longer have an impact and the ratio 
should only be a function of the relative efficiency of research activities in the two 
countries.  We  assume  a  logarithmic  specification  between  the  ratio  of  research 
expenditures in country c and h, and the factors determining the relative efficiency of 
research, giving:  
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If we follow a similar approach for the equation for development expenditures, we 
obtain an equation in which the ratio of development expenditures only is a function 
of relative market demand and the relative efficiency of development activities:  
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  We apply the model to the R&D investments by Japanese multinational firms 
in Japan and abroad in 1996. Our main source of data is the survey of Trends in   11 
Business  Activities  of  Foreign  Affiliates  conducted  by  the  Ministry  of  Economy, 
Trade and Industry in fiscal year 1996 (the year ending March 31, 1997). This survey 
contains  information  on  the  overseas  affiliates  of  Japanese  firms,  including  their 
expenditure on R&D. This official survey is regulated under the Statistics Law of 
Japan and received a response rate of 78 percent at the affiliate level.
3 The responses 
are seen as representative and include large numbers of major multinational firms. 
From  this  survey  we  select  parent  firms  active  in  manufacturing  industries  and 
operating at least one manufacturing affiliate abroad. A further selection had to be 
made because the response rate for the R&D question is relatively low. Our analysis 
requires that for parent firms with multiple affiliates in a country, reliable data are 
available  on  R&D  for  all  such  affiliates,  in  order  to  calculate  overall  R&D 
expenditures by the parent in the country. We also require accurate data on R&D 
expenditures by the parent firm in Japan, which are (not in all cases) available from 
the Basic Survey of Business Enterprises. In total this left us with 605 parent firms 
active in 42 foreign countries, giving 1702 observations. Total R&D expenditure by 




The variables in equations (17) and (18) are defined as follows: 
c j R , = research expenditures by the parent firm in foreign country c in 1996; 
h j R ,  = research expenditures by the parent firm in Japan in 1996;  
c j D , = development expenditures by the parent firm in foreign country c in 1996; 
h j D ,  = development expenditures by the parent firm in Japan in 1996;  
c i O , = number of patents granted in the 2-digit ISIC industry of the parent firm on 
innovations in country c (1994-1997); 
h i O , = number of patents granted in the 2-digit ISIC industry of the parent firm on 
innovations in Japan (1994-1997); 
c j S , = sales of manufacturing affiliates of the firm in country c in 1996;  
h j S , = (unconsolidated) sales of the Japanese parent firm in 1996;  
                                                
3 Affiliates are included in the survey if the Japanese firm owns at least 10 percent of equity.   12 
c i G , =  percentage  growth  1994-1996  in  production  of  the  2-digit  ISIC  industry  in 
country c; 
h i G , =  percentage  growth  1994-1996  in  production of  the  2-digit  ISIC  industry  in 
Japan; 
c P = the index of intellectual property rights protection in 1995 for country c; 
h P = the index of intellectual property rights protection in 1995 for Japan; 
c U = wage costs in country c; 
h U = wage costs in Japan; 
c N = number of scientists and engineers per capita in country c; 
h N = number of scientists and engineers per capita in Japan; 
 
  Unconsolidated sales data of the Japanese parent firms are drawn from the 
METI survey, as are the figures on total sales of manufacturing affiliates. As proxy 
for technological opportunity we take the number of patent grants (1994-1997) to 
inventors in the country c and Japan in the ISIC industry in which the firm is active. 
The  number  of  patent  grants  is  likely  to  be  a  suitable  proxy  for  technological 
opportunity, as differences in patenting activities indicate more rapid technological 
developments that are likely to lead to appropriable benefits. A three year period, 
1994-1997, appears a suitable horizon to measure innovative activities relevant to 
1996 R&D investment decisions. Since patents are granted with a 1-3 year lag, grants 
in 1997 will reflect innovation activity in 1994-1996. The patent grants are assigned 
to country residents on the basis of the address of the inventor listed in the patent 
information. Patents are assigned to ISIC industries based on the MERIT patent to 
industry concordance, adapted to third revision ISIC classifications. This concordance 
attaches  to  each  international  patent  classification  code  (IPC,  describing  the 
technological domain of the patent) a probability that it is originating in a specific 
ISIC industry, based on the industries of applicant firms. Data on production growth 
in the ISIC manufacturing industries are gross output data drawn from the OECD 
STAN Database for Industrial Analysis and UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics database. 
For China, data were taken from the China Statistical Yearbook. Production figures 
were converted into Yen. All 1994 nominal values were converted into 1996 prices   13 
using the GDP deflator. The index of intellectual property rights is due to Ginarte and 
Park  (1997)
4  and  measures  the  strength  of  patents  laws  and  enforcement.  The 
advantage is that it allows a systematic comparison of IPR protection across countries. 
Wage costs are 1996 monthly manufacturing wages (converted into Yen) drawn from 
UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics database. The number of scientists and engineers per 
country was drawn from the OECD’s Indicators of Science and Technology database, 
and UNIDO’s World Development Indicators database.  
  The analysis requires a distinction between R and D. The METI survey asks 
affiliates  for  the  (multiple)  purpose(s)  of  R&D,  distinguishing  between  basic  or 
applied research or development and design of products and processes for local or 
international markets. Given that affiliates often mention multiple purposes we cannot 
assign R&D expenditures to research or development uniquely, but the data allow us 
to make a rough decomposition over the different types of R&D activities in different 
countries. We treat the R&D expenditures of affiliates answering that they engaged in 
research activities (either in combination or without development expenditures) as 
research  expenditures.  Affiliates  that  do  not  report  to  be  engaged  in  research  are 
treated  as  being  engaged  in  development  activities  only.
5  For  R&D  in  Japan  no 
similar firm-level data on R&D functions are available. Instead we utilized industry-
level  data  on  the  share  of  research  and  development,  respectively,  in  total  R&D 
expenditures, as published by Japan’s Science and Technology Agency in the Survey 
of Research and Development. 
  One problem in estimating equations (17) and (18) is that we have a substantial 
number of firms reporting zero R&D in countries, while the logarithmic form for the 
dependent variable rules out zero values for R or D. One solution to this problem is to 
assume that all Japanese firms with US affiliates will engage in some kind of limited 
R&D activities, which remains unreported. Kleinknecht (1987) and Roper (1999) find 
that small and medium sized enterprise engage in process and product development 
efforts but do not report this in official surveys. In overseas affiliates of Japanese 
firms likewise no accounting system may be in place to record R&D efforts that are 
taking place, if such efforts are very limited. If we assume that all firms underreport 
R&D expenditures abroad by a very small amount, we can add a small ratio of (0.1 
                                                
4 We thank Walter Park for generally providing us with an extended list of country IPR indices. 
5 This method was chosen because in practice, affiliates only engaging in research are very rare, 
while it is more common that affiliates only engage in development activities.    14 
percent) to each R&D ratio. The means and standard deviations of the variables are 
given in Table 1.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
  Since the decision by firms to conduct development and research activities abroad 
are not independent, we estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model 
allowing for correlation between the error terms of the equations. Table 2 reports the 
empirical results. The results broadly confirm the validity of our model. Relative IPR 
protection  and  relative  technological  opportunity  increase  relative  research 
expenditures significantly, while wage costs reduce them. The relative availability of 
scientists and engineers (number of scientists and engineers per capita) is wrongly 
signed  but  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  In  accordance  with  our  model, 
relative  development  expenditures  increase  in  relative  market  growth  and  relative 
strength  of  the  IPR  regime,  while  relative  wage  costs  reduce  development 
expenditures. The relative availability of scientists and engineers has the correct sign 
but is not significantly different from zero.  
  It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient for wage costs in the research 
equation  is  higher  than  the  coefficient  in  the  development  equation.  For  IPR 
protection a similar but much less pronounced pattern is visible. This is consistent 
with our model, which showed that research efficiency in other countries (e.g. Japan) 
has a negative impact on research expenditures in a country, whilst there is no such 
rivalry in attracting development expenditures. Hence, research expenditures are more 
sensitive to wage levels in a country, since higher wages do not only reduce research 
efficiency  and  hence  research  efforts  directly,  but  also  lead  to  a  reallocation  of 
research efforts to other countries as relative research efficiency is reduced. 
  The coefficient of correlation of the error terms is significant and negative. Given 
the positive interaction between research efforts and developments efforts implied by 
our model, there is however no reason to expect a tradeoff between research and 
development expenditures in host countries. The negative correlation term is therefore 
likely to be correcting for the impact of the applied decomposition rule, according to 
which all R&D expenditures are assigned to research (and none to development) if   15 
affiliates  report  to  be  involved  in  research  activities.  This  creates  a  negative 
correlation between research and development at the affiliate level.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
  In this paper, we empirically examined the impact of the strength of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection on the location of research and development activities 
of multinational firms. We developed a monopolistic competition model of global 
investments in research and development, in which research activities increase the 
number  of  varieties  of goods  sold  globally  by  a  firm, and  development  activities 
reduce the cost of producing existing varieties in specific countries. The efficiency of 
development efforts in a  country  depends  on  the  strength  of  the  IPR  regime,  the 
quality  of  the  local  research  base,  and  the  wage  costs  of  local  researchers.  The 
efficiency  of  research  activities  in  a  country  is  also  dependent  on  technological 
opportunities  in  the  industry.  The  model  suggested  that  research  expenditure  in a 
country  depends  positively  on  research  efficiency  in  the  country,  global  market 
demand of the firm, and the global efficiency of the firm’s development activities. 
The relative efficiency of research in other countries, however, has a negative impact, 
making research efforts in different countries substitutes. Development expenditures 
depend positively on the firm’s market potential in the country and the efficiency of 
local development efforts, as well as global research efficiency of the firm and global 
demand potential. The efficiency of development activities in other countries has an 
additional positive impact, such that development efforts in different countries are 
complements. Global development activities stimulate global market shares and the 
incentive  to  invest  in  research.  The  resulting  increase  in  the  firm’s  variety  in 
commodities in turn makes development activities more effective in local markets.  
  Based on the model, we derived an empirical specification for the ratio between 
research  expenditures  in  a  country  and  research  expenditures  in  Japan,  and  an 
equation  for  the  ratio  of  development  expenditures  in  a  country  to  development 
expenditures  in  Japan.  We  estimated  these  equations  jointly  using  Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression, on a sample of 1702 observations on R and D by 605 Japanese 
multinational firms with manufacturing activities in 42 foreign countries in 1996. We 
found that the degree of IPR protection in a country, as indicated by its score on the   16 
strength of patent law and patent enforcement, has a significantly positive impact both 
on  development  expenditures  and  research  expenditures.  Both  research  and 
development expenditures are sensitive to local wage costs, but not to the quality of 
the research base if this is measured as the number of scientists and engineers per 
capita. Research expenditures depend positively on technological opportunities in the 
industry  and  country,  while  development  expenditures  are  positively  affected  by 
potential local demand for the firm.  
  A  number  of  implications  follow  from  our  analysis.  The  results  imply  that 
developing countries’ efforts to strengthen IPR protection regimes will help them to 
attract  more  R&D  activities  by  foreign  multinationals.  In  case  of  development 
expenditures, the analysis suggest that such strengthening is not putting countries ‘in 
competition’ with their neighbors to offer the strictest IPR regime, as countries are not 
likely to attract development activities away from other countries. On the other hand, 
IPR  protection  and  wage  costs  are  also  important  factors  to  attract  research,  and 
countries  with  lower  wages  and  strengthened  IPR  protection  compete  to  attract  a 
larger share of multinational firms’ global research efforts.  
  There  are  a  number  of  ways  to  improve  the  current  analysis.  First,  a  better 
distinction between research and development expenditures in Japan is necessary to 
improve the reliability of the results. Here perhaps use can be made of published 
reports on employment in, and purpose of, research laboratories in Japan at the firm 
level. Second, the insignificant impact of our proxy for the quality of the research 
base (scientists and engineers per capita) suggests exploring the impact of different 
proxies such as indicators of the importance of tertiary education. Third, a limitation 
of the analysis is  the cross section  nature of the data. We intend to replicate the 
analysis for a more recent year in order to gain insight into possible changes in the 
determinants of foreign R&D expenditures. Utilizing data on the strength of patent 
protection and enforcement in 2000, we can investigate whether the improvements in 
IPR regimes in several countries has led to an increase in research or development 
activities by Japanese multinational firms. 
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable          Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
log(Rc,i/Rh,i)  1702  -6,496   1,632   -6,908   6,402  
log(Dc,i/Dh,i)  1702  -6,593   1,034   -6,908   1,116  
log(Oc,j,/Oh,j)  1702  -3,242   2,717   -10,095   1,798  
log(Nc/Nh)  1702  -1,383   1,259   -4,004   -0,207  
log(Uc/Uh)  1702  -0,592   0,995   -3,649   0,321  
log(Pc/Ph)  1702  -0,185   0,310   -1,351   0,137  
log((Gc,j * Sc,i) / (Gh,j * Sh,i)  1702  -3,930   1,859   -12,362   2,723  
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TABLE 2. Estimates of Equations (17) and (18) using SUR 
   Coef.  Std. Err.    
Research equation       
log(Oc,j,/Oh,j)  0,107   0,024   *** 
log(Nc/Nh)  -0,051   0,048    
log(Uc/Uh)  -0,184   0,056   *** 
log(Pc/Ph)  0,567   0,244   ** 
Constant  -6,224   0,068   *** 
       
Development equation       
log((Gc,j * Sc,i) / (Gh,j * Sh,i)  0,133   0,013   *** 
log(Nc/Nh)  0,014   0,028    
log(Uc/Uh)  -0,139   0,035   *** 
log(Pc/Ph)  0,527   0,129   *** 
Constant  -6,036   0,062   *** 
           
Correlation coefficient residuals:  -0,1549       
Breusch-Pagan chi2(1) test of 
independence:  40.851    *** 
Observations  1702     
Chi square Research  69,15    *** 
Chi square Development  148,82    *** 
R square Research  0,037     
R square Development  0,067     
Note: **, *** is significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 